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Abstract
Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy of September 15, 2008, a number of foreign
governments enacted stabilization measures in order to bolster their currencies and inject
much-needed liquidity into domestic markets. As part of its effort, the Korean Ministry of
Strategy and Finance announced a series of government interventions that included a threeyear guarantee of foreign debt issued (including extensions of maturity) by domestic banks
between October 20, 2008, and June 30, 2009. This opt-in program was introduced as a
preemptive step in ensuring that Korean financial institutions would retain competitive
access to external funding in the wake of the global credit crunch. Though the guarantee cap
was set at $100 billion, maximum utilization totaled only $1.3 billion issued by a single
participant (Hana Bank). On June 30, 2012, the guarantee scheme was terminated with the
repayment of all obligations by Hana Bank.
Keywords: Korea, foreign debt, government guarantee

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering the responses to the global financial crisis that pertain to bank debt guarantee
programs.
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The State Guarantee of
External Debt of Korean Banks
At a Glance
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September of 2008 prompted many
governments of developed economies to
coordinate stabilization efforts in order to
calm domestic and global markets. Among
those, the Republic of Korea enacted on
October 20, 2008, a series of measures that
its Ministry of Strategy and Finance
recommended would both aid in boosting
the won against the dollar and help to
relieve liquidity pressures stemming from
the foreign currency loans coming to
maturity in the midst of the worldwide
credit crunch. This package included a
$100 billion, three-year government
guarantee of foreign debt issued (including
extensions of maturity) by domestic banks
between October 20, 2008, and June 30,
2009. The opt-in program would allow
participants access to guarantee coverage
for up to 100% of principal and interest,
including default interest and related
expenses.

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: To guarantee the foreign currency debt
issued (including extensions of maturity) by
domestic banks between the period of October 20,
2008, and June 30, 2009, in order to relieve liquidity
strains stemming from those banks’ difficulties in
repaying their foreign currency loans.
Announcement Date

October 19, 2008

Operational Date

October 20, 2008

Date of First Guaranteed
Loan Issuance

April 6, 2009

Issuance Window
Expiration Date

Originally June 30,
2009; Extended to
December 31, 2009

Program Size

$100 billion

Usage

$1.3 billion by Hana
Bank in total

Outcomes

No defaults

Notable Features

Limited to debt issued
in foreign currencies to
ensure continued access
to external funding

Eligible domestic banks needed to apply to the Ministry of Strategy and Finance to obtain
foreign debt guarantees. Individual guarantee limits were set based on the Korean Financial
Services Commission’s assessment of each eligible bank’s foreign debt maturing by June 30,
2009.
Only Hana Bank, one of Korea’s four largest banks, applied to participate in the program,
issuing a total of $1.3 billion in guaranteed bonds in April and June of 2009. The State
Guarantee program was terminated with the repayment of all commitments by Hana Bank
on June 30, 2012.
Summary Evaluation

Given its limited utilization, few have evaluated the success of the guarantee program in
isolation from other stabilization measures enacted at the time.
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The State Guarantee of External Debt of Korean Banks: South Korea
Context
$1.2 trillion in 2007
$1.0 trillion in 2008

GDP
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, Nominal GDP
in LCU converted to
USD)

Source: Bloomberg
$24,086 per capita in 2007
$21,350 per capita in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
As of Q4, 2007:

Sovereign credit
rating (5-year senior
debt)

Fitch: AA
Moody’s: A2
S&P: A+
As of Q4, 2008:
Fitch: AA
Moody’s: A2
S&P: A+
Source: Bloomberg

Size of banking
system

$1.1 trillion in total assets in 2007
$1.1 trillion in total assets in 2008
Source: Bloomberg
94.2% in 2007
101.5% in 2008

Size of banking
system as a
percentage of GDP
Size of banking
system as a
percentage of
financial system

Source: Bloomberg
Banking system assets equal to 100% of
financial system
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
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Foreign involvement
in banking system

Government
ownership of banking
system

Existence of deposit
insurance
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79.3% of total banking assets in 2007
Data not available for 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
12% of total banking assets in 2007
13% of total banking assets in 2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
Data not available for 2007
22.2% of bank assets owned by the state in
2008
Source: World Bank Global Financial
Development Database
100% insurance on deposits up to $44,792 in
mid-September 2008
Source: Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and
Related Financial Safety Net Aspects, OECD
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Overview

Background
Having previously weathered the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the Republic of Korea was
considered to have been relatively more prepared than its Western counterparts to manage
the economic fallout from the Global Financial Crisis (Rhee 2008). However, the country was
not completely immune to the deleterious effects of the subprime downturn in 2007; Korea
in particular suffered major losses in the first half of 2008 as overseas investors collectively
withdrew $886 million and net foreign direct investment turned negative for the first time
since 1980 (Fackler 2008). This divestment would later contribute to a deterioration in
Korea’s ability to repay its external debts. Consequently, despite efforts by the government
to emphasize the economy’s relatively stable domestic position, Korean markets remained
vulnerable to exogenous shocks (Harden 2008).
Confidence dropped precipitously over the summer of 2008 as the stock market plummeted
38% and the Korean won fell 30% against the dollar (Harden 2008). In response, both banks
and major corporations, such as Hyundai and Samsung, began hoarding domestic currency
(Harden 2008, Sang-Hun 2008). To worsen matters, the September 15 Lehman Brothers
bankruptcy sent global credit markets into turmoil and fueled further anxieties over the
strength of Korea’s export markets and foreign currency reserves (Fackler 2008). Domestic
banks also began to bear the costs of the crisis more directly: Woori Bank, one of Korea’s
largest lenders, found itself unable to borrow after the collapse. Overseas banks refused to
roll over many existing loans and insisted that Woori pay in dollars as the debt came to
maturity (Fackler 2008). Dollar loans from the government totaling $280 million kept the
bank afloat.
This lending crisis spread quickly throughout the Korean financial system as it became
increasingly clear that domestic banks would not be able to honor their maturing foreign
currency loans. Following news of Lehman’s insolvency, between 4Q2008 and 1Q2009, the
banking sector suffered from rapid deleveraging as $42.8 billion in assets were taken out of
the country (Kim 2009). Such a large selloff, coupled with the depreciation of the won and
rising borrowing costs, caused Moody’s to declare Korea to be “one of the few banking
systems in Asia where domestic deposits are insufficient to fund loans” (Eggertson and
Krugman 2016, Sang-Hun 2008). Additionally, S&P downgraded the Big Four Korean banks
—Kookmin Bank, Woori Bank, Shinhan Bank, and Hana Bank—from “stable” to “negative”on
October 1. Their ability to raise foreign capital thus continued to decline (Gup 2010).
Having relatively recently opened its markets to the international community, Korea did not
have access to the same emergency sources of foreign currency reserves as did other
countries (Fackler 2008). At the same time, it was more susceptible to market instability due
to its transparency and openness to foreign capital (Fackler 2008). The Korean government
attempted to calm markets by pointing to the soundness of the domestic real economy,
particularly in terms of its low sovereign debt levels and steady economic growth of 4.5%
over the previous five years (Rhee 2008). Still, it was decided on October 19, 2008, that the
government should follow its international counterparts in instituting tangible stabilization
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measures. As part of the program, the government began to offer guarantees on inter-bank
loans to mitigate the ongoing liquidity crisis, “calm markets and preemptively minimize the
total cost of employing the intervention” at a later date (Rhee 2008).
Program Description
The State Guarantee of External Debt of Korean Banks (henceforth, the “State Guarantee”)
would be operational from its announcement date of October 20, 2008, through June 30,
2009. The Operational Guidelines for National Guarantees of Foreign Debt Obligations of
Domestic Banks (henceforth, “The Guidelines”), served as the memorandum of
understanding between the government and the bank applying to issue debt under the
guarantee program (2008). The “Proposed measures” document, a press release issued on
October 19, 2008, by the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance, outlined the projected
terms of the State Guarantee (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009).
Under the authority of Article 92 of the National Finance Act, the Enforcement Decree of the
National Finance Act, and The Rules for the Management of State Guarantees, the Korean
government introduced a foreign debt guarantee scheme as part of a comprehensive set of
stabilization measures intended to alleviate market liquidity pressures and ensure that its
domestic banks maintained a competitive advantage in overseas funding (Ministry of
Strategy and Finance 2008). Together with the Bank of Korea, the government would
provide the banking sector with an additional $30 billion in dollar liquidity from foreign
exchange reserves. Among other measures, it also provided tax incentives for the long-term
holding of funds, invested Korean Won 1 trillion (ca. $760.5 million3) in the Industrial Bank
of Korea, and took concrete steps to strengthen regional and international ties.
Recapitalization of financial institutions and the expansion of deposit guarantees were
deemed unnecessary at the time (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008).
“We believe providing the government guarantee on banks’ foreign exchange dealings is the
strongest step to save our foreign exchange reserves,” said Korean Finance Minister Kang
Man-soo (Kim and Choonsik 2008).
Any debt denominated in foreign currency issued (including extensions of maturity) by a
domestic Korean bank or its overseas branches during this period and owed to a “nonresident” institution (excluding foreign currency deposits and subordinated debt) would be
eligible for a guarantee by the government for up to three years from the date of issuance or
acquisition (The Guidelines). The government does not appear to have established minimum
maturity requirements for eligible debt. On April 30, 2009, the guarantee was extended by
the Ministry of Strategy and Finance to five years, although this allowance would prove to be
unnecessary given the program’s limited utilization (Ministry of Strategy and Finance
2009a).
The Korean government needed to secure the approval of the National Assembly to fund the
guarantee structure. In the interim, either the Korean Development Bank or Korea Eximbank

3

The October 20, 2008, exchange rate was 1 U.S. dollar = 1,315 Korean Won.
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would provide guarantees. The Ministry of Strategy and Finance would then, after having
received authorization, assume responsibility for all guarantees, including those previously
offered by KDB or Korea Eximbank (“Proposed measures”). New debt would be guaranteed
by the government only if explicitly requested and applied for (The Guidelines). The
standardized guarantee (participation) fee, regardless of an individual bank’s credit rating,
equaled 1% per annum of the daily outstanding balance of guaranteed debt on the basis of a
360-day calendar year (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009a). However, the Ministry of
Strategy and Finance retained the right to set different guarantee fee rates “depending on
market conditions, the financial condition of the Obligor, performance of covenants by an
Obligor…and other relevant factors” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009a). On February
16, 2009, the Korean government lowered the guarantee fee to 0.7% per annum (Ministry of
Strategy and Finance 2009a).
The government imposed a $100 billion cap on the total value of guarantees, as it was
estimated that the external debt reaching maturity by the end of June 2009 would total $80
billion (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008). There were also individual guarantee limits
imposed on each bank. These were determined by the Financial Services Commission, which
gathered information from the Financial Supervisory Services on the amount of each
domestic bank’s foreign debt maturing by June 30, 2009, and added an extra 25% cushion
(Jin-Woo 2008).
The guarantee agreement would be triggered by an event in which the “Obligor fails to satisfy
its payments on a date due as required under the Guaranteed Debt” (Ministry of Strategy and
Finance 2009a). Coverage would include 100% of principal and interest, as well as default
interest and related expenses, accrued “until the date of actual payment by the guarantor, up
to the Guaranteed Amount” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009a). The government
would also pay out in the event that the guaranteed debt were accelerated “as a result of the
Obligor’s failure to comply with the covenants under the Guaranteed Debt” (Ministry of
Strategy and Finance 2009a).
Outcomes
The Korean government issued only two bond guarantees to one of its eligible domestic
banks over the course of the program’s duration. On April 6, 2009, Hana Bank issued $1
billion worth of guaranteed bonds for a period of three years. Subsequently, it issued $280
million for a period of either two and a half or three years. Hana Bank was ultimately able to
meet all payments to foreign creditors without triggering the guarantee (Korea Institute of
Finance 2009). All obligations, as specified by The Guidelines, were repaid to the lenders by
June 30, 2012, at which point the program was terminated (Korea Institute of Finance 2009).
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Key Design Decisions

1. The State Guarantee was announced as part of a package of proposed stabilization
measures released by the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance on October 19,
2008.
Together with the Bank of Korea, the government would provide the banking sector with an
additional $30 billion in dollar liquidity from foreign exchange reserves. Among other
measures, it also provided tax incentives for the long-term holding of funds, invested Korean
Won 1 trillion in the Industrial Bank of Korea, and took concrete steps to strengthen regional
and international ties. Recapitalization of financial institutions and the expansion of deposit
guarantees were deemed unnecessary at the time
2. The Korean government implemented the State Guarantee using its authority
under Article 92 of the National Finance Act, the Enforcement Decree of the National
Finance Act, and The Rules for the Management of State Guarantees.
As discussed below, pending formal legal approval from the National Assembly, Korean
authorities utilized the Korea Development Bank and Korea Eximbank to finance the State
Guarantee.
3. The State Guarantee would be financed by Korea Development Bank or Korea
Eximbank until approved by the National Assembly.
The Korea Development Bank and Korea Eximbank were charged with the responsibility of
financing guarantees before the Ministry received formal approval from the National
Assembly (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008). After gaining authorization, the Ministry
would assume responsibility for all guarantees, including those previously offered by KDB
or Eximbank (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008).
4. Up to $100 billion in debt could be guaranteed under the program.
It was estimated that the external debt reaching maturity by the end of June 2009 would total
$80 billion (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008).
5. All domestic banks and foreign branches of those domestic banks were eligible for
the State Guarantee.
According to Article 2 “Definitions” of The Guidelines, the term “Domestic Bank” refers to
any one of the following: (i) Kookmin Bank, Shinhan Bank, Woori Bank, Hana Bank, Korea
Exchange Bank, Citibank Korea, Standard Chartered First Bank Korea, Pusan Bank, Daegu
Bank, Kwang Ju Bank, Kyongnam Bank, Jeonbuk Bank, and Jeju Bank, each established under
the Banking Act; (ii) the Korea Development Bank established under the Korea Development
Bank Act; (iii) Industrial Bank of Korea established under the Industrial Bank of Korea Act;
(iv) the Export-Import Bank of Korea established under the Export-Import Bank of Korea
Act; (v) National Agricultural Cooperative Federation established under the Agricultural
Cooperatives Act; and (vi) National Federation of Fisheries Cooperatives established under
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the Fisheries Cooperatives Act. “Domestic Bank” includes foreign branches of a Domestic
Bank” (2008).
6. Initially, eligible debt included any debt denominated in foreign currency issued
(including extensions of maturity) by a domestic Korean bank or its overseas
branches during this period and owed to a “non-resident” institution (excluding
foreign currency deposits and subordinated debt).
“Non-resident” as defined in Article 3, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 13 of the “Foreign
Exchange Transaction Act” (2008), excludes branches of foreign banks located in Korea by
definition since the Act defines them as “residents.” However, Article 2, Paragraph 2 of The
Guidelines (October 31, 2008) included them as “non-residents” (Ministry of Strategy and
Finance 2008)
The “non-resident” definition part of Article 2, Paragraph 2 was deleted when the
“Operational Guideline” was partially revised, as the purpose of the guarantee was thus
changed from “State Guarantee of the Foreign Currency Debt of Domestic Banks owed to
Non-Residents” to “State Guarantee of the Foreign Currency Debt.” This has the effect of
extending eligibility to include foreign currency debt owed to “residents” as well as “nonresidents.”
7. Initially, the State Guarantee would cover eligible debt for up to three years from
the date of debt issuance or acquisition before this was later extended to five years.
The three-year period was later extended to five years, but all obligations were met by June
30, 2012. The government does not appear to have established minimum maturity
requirements for eligible debt.
8. All foreign currencies were eligible.
Korean authorities limited eligibility to foreign currencies given their focus on ensuring
institutions’ access to external funding.
9. There were individual guarantee limits imposed on each bank based on the
amount of such bank’s foreign debt maturing by June 30, 2009.
These limits were determined by the Financial Services Commission, which gathered
information from the Financial Supervisory Services on the amount of each domestic bank’s
foreign debt maturing by June 30, 2009, and added an extra 25% cushion (Jin-Woo 2008).
10. Participating banks were required to pay a standardized guarantee
(participation) fee of 1% per annum of guaranteed debt, subject to increase. The
guarantee fee was later reduced to 0.7% per annum on February 16, 2009.
This standard fee, based off a 360-day calendar year, was imposed regardless of the
individual bank’s credit rating. However, the Ministry of Strategy and Finance retained the
right to set different guarantee fee rates “depending on market conditions, the financial
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condition of the Obligor, performance of covenants by an Obligor [. . .] and other relevant
factors” (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2009a).
11. Participating banks were required to sign a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with the Financial Supervisory Services and report to them on a daily basis the
usage of the guaranteed fund.
The MOU restricted the usage of the state-guaranteed funds to repayment of existing foreign
currency debts.
12. The State Guarantee was designed to cover 100% of principal and accrued
interest, including default interest and related expenses.
The Korean government would fulfill its guarantee obligations if the “Obligor [failed] to
satisfy its payments on the due date as required under the Guaranteed Debt” (Ministry of
Strategy and Finance 2009a). The Korean government would also honor the guarantee
payments in the case that the debt under contract was to be “accelerated as a result of the
Obligor’s failure to comply with covenants under the Guaranteed Debt” (Ministry of Strategy
and Finance 2009a).
13. The issuance window was extended past its original date of June 30, 2009, to
December 31, 2009.
This extension occurred despite limited utilization of the State Guarantee.

III. Evaluation
This intervention was employed as a temporary measure meant to calm domestic markets
and preempt any assumptions that Korean banks were not as stable or competitive as their
international counterparts (Ministry of Strategy and Finance 2008). It was also intended to
boost the won and relieve liquidity pressures stemming from maturing foreign loans by
shoring up confidence in domestic banks’ ability to lend (Ministry of Strategy and Finance
2008). Managing Director of the IMF Dominique Strauss-Kahn initially hailed the
intervention as one that would “bring Korea's policies closer in line with advanced countries,
including some in the region, and help ease pressures in the local dollar funding market”
(IMF 2008). Given the limited utilization of the guarantee program, few have evaluated its
domestic impact or its role in the greater Global Financial Crisis.
Dongchul Cho, Professor at the KDI School of Public Policy and Management, concluded that
implementing the series of stabilization measures “must have helped mitigate concerns of
international investors” (2010). Furthermore, by the end of 2009, several domestic banks
were able to access international capital markets without having to resort to the government
guarantee scheme (Shabsingh 2013). Implementation of the entire stabilization package
immediately boosted the won as much as 22% against the dollar (Harden 2008).
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Conversely, Shenai argued that the “proximate effects of this intervention were clear: despite
the announcement, the won continued to depreciate, and the stock market continued its skid.
South Korea was not able to autonomously stem capital outflows” (2009). This situation was
not unique to the won or Korean equity markets; many other emerging-market economies
suffered similar depreciations in their local currencies and capital outflows. Shenai contends
that the subsequent dollar liquidity swap agreement with the U.S. Federal Reserve was
mainly responsible for calming markets (2009). Similarly, Hyekyung Cho argues in a report
for the North-South Institute that although these “emergency measures temporarily
stabilized the won, [they] did not help stop the massive capital outflow” (Cho 2012). These
appraisals most likely reflected the strength of Korea’s domestic economy more than the
actual success of the guarantee part of the government aid package, itself.

IV.
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